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It says a lot about the current U.S. perspective on international
law that the first 144 pages of a 213-page book entitled Trade,
Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade are spent
convincing the reader that “trade law inescapably involves
questions of justice.”1  This is not a criticism directed against
author Frank Garcia; rather, it is a sobering remark on the
prevailing realist approach to international law in the American
academy, an approach that explains international cooperation as
the mere pursuit of self-interest and power and disavows any
normative value to international law.2 As Garcia states in the
book’s preface, “[t]he core argument of the book is that
international trade law does not exist outside of the realm of
justice—in other words, we must consider the claims of justice
when analyzing international trade law.”3
It is difficult to disagree with Garcia’s central claim. More than
ever, trade agreements encroach on a broad range of social
concerns: European importation of genetically modified food4;
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1. FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY, AND JUSTICE: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY
OF JUST TRADE 144 (2003).
2. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005) (explaining compliance with international law as the choice of rational states that
maximize their interests in the accumulation of power or other goods).
3. GARCIA, supra note 1, at xix.
4. See Request by the United States for Establishment of a WTO Panel Concerning
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Latin American “dollar” bananas threatening the livelihood of
banana growers in Africa5; intellectual property rights to essential
drugs in poor countries devastated by AIDS6; and the loss of U.S.
manufacturing jobs due to competition from India and China. All
of these trade issues inescapably involve the type of “questions of
justice” to which Garcia refers, pitting developed against
developing countries, declining against emerging industries,
workers harmed by trade against consumers benefiting from it,
and new technologies that may save lives against concerns about
the morality and safety of genetic modification. Garcia must be
complimented for addressing these issues directly and
acknowledging the moral underpinnings of the sometimes dry
and technical field of trade law.
I.  GARCIA’S “LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE”
Trade, Inequality, and Justice focuses exclusively on justice in the
context of trade relations between developed and developing
countries. The book starts from the premise of inherent or natural
inequalities between developed and developing countries—
focusing on the “smallness” of developing country economies and
their unequal share in natural endowments7—and argues that
those inequalities require special and differential treatment in
favor of developing countries.8 For Garcia, such special and
differential treatment is a form of redistributive justice derived
from a moral obligation on rich countries to ensure not only free,
but just, trade. Special and differential treatment can, the author
asserts, “play a central role in satisfying the moral obligations that
wealthier states owe poorer states as a matter of distributive
justice.”9 Garcia founds this moral obligation of developed
countries on the very idea of liberalism, the fundamental
requirement of which is, in his words, “that the acceptability of
European Community Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech
Products, WT/DS291/23 (Aug. 8, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm.
5. See WTO Appellate Body Report on E.C. Regime for the Importation, Sale and
Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, DSR 1997: II, 591 (Sept. 25, 1997).
6. See Frederick M. Abbott, The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health: Lighting a Dark Corner at the WTO, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 469, 472–74 (2002).
7. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 23.
8. Id. at 31.
9. Id. at 40.
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outcomes be demonstrable to any and all affected individuals.”10
Since most rich countries are liberal states, they have already made
political commitments toward justice and equality by virtue of
their liberalism; they must, according to Garcia, simply extend
their liberal values to others outside of their borders, in casu those
in developing countries.11 More specifically, Garcia considers “the
role of justice in international economic relations as a function of
our individual moral commitments, carried out in the
international arena through the state as our moral agent,” and
locates “the inquiry into justice and international trade law in our
relationships to persons in other jurisdictions.”12
Within liberalism, Garcia selects John Rawls’ “Justice as Fairness”
theory13 to justify and explain the moral obligation of rich
countries to give certain preferences to developing countries.14
Shielded by an original “veil of ignorance,” no one knows what his
or her distribution of natural primary goods (including
intelligence, social status, and natural endowments) will eventually
be; Rawls argues that individuals will choose principles that
guarantee them the maximum social primary goods possible
(including liberty, opportunity, income, and wealth) if they
happen to be born with the minimum distribution of natural
primary goods. As Garcia states:
[W]hen faced with a risk of unknown probability that they will
find themselves the most disadvantaged in the natural lottery,
those in the original position will maximize the minimum share
allocated under the system of primary social goods. The
resulting difference principle . . . best expresses this “maximin”
strategy, in that any justifiable inequality must therefore work to the
advantage of the least well-endowed.15
Although Rawls himself steadfastly refuses to extend his
argument to international distributive problems, limiting his
analysis to what he defines as closed domestic societies,16 Garcia
10. Id. at 56.
11. Id. at 102 (“[W]ithin liberalism one is obligated to justify one’s actions, or the
actions of one’s state, by reference to the basic liberal commitment to the moral equality
of human beings or their good.  The logic of this obligation is equally relevant when we
are in economic relations with human beings outside our boundaries.”).
12. Id. at 69.
13. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, THEORY OF
JUSTICE]; JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
14. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 119.
15. Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
16. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 86 (1999). As Rawls stated elsewhere, “I shall
be satisfied if it is possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basis
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translates this “difference principle” to the world of trade:
“International social and economic inequalities are just only if
they result in compensating benefits for all states, and in particular
for the least advantaged states.”17
II.  THE “LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE” APPLIED TO SPECIAL AND
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In a major leap from idealized theories of justice to one specific
aspect of trade diplomacy, Garcia identifies special and differential
treatment granted by developed to developing countries as a form
of inequality. He then examines whether this inequality meets his
international “difference principle”; in other words, does it result
in compensating benefits for all, and in particular for the least
advantaged states?18 After an excellent analysis of preferential
trade schemes and their often perverse effect, Garcia concludes
that such schemes—and in particular that adopted by the United
States—are not justified under the “difference principle” because
(1) they are unilateral and conditional in nature, as developed
countries are not obliged to have a preference scheme and, if they
have one, can condition it on a “grab bag” of political and other
requirements19; and (2) they exclude many goods of the greatest
interest to developing countries, including textiles and sugar.20  As
a result, Garcia argues, current preferential schemes benefit the
least advantaged less than they benefit the United States itself, and
therefore fail to meet the requirement of just trade under the
“difference principle.”21
Rather than turning away from preferential schemes and
seeking alternatives to achieve “just trade,” however, Garcia insists
on the potential of special and differential treatment and, in
conclusion, proposes two remedies: (1) make trade preferences
granted by developed to developing countries binding,
unconditional, and inclusive of all goods22; and (2) permit
developing countries to continue to protect their markets from
structure of society conceived for the time being as a closed system isolated from other
societies.” RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 8.
17. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 134 (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 147–48.
19. Id. at 164.
20. Id. at 159–60.
21. Id. at 164.
22. Id. at 168.
PAUWELYN.MACRO 03/22/05  4:37 PM
2005] Just Trade 105
import competition (“non-reciprocity in market protection”)23 or
at least give developing countries meaningful implementation
periods coupled with the right to technical assistance to help them
achieve compliance with trade agreements.24
Interestingly, in a recent challenge by India to the European
Community (E.C.) system of tariff preferences for developing
countries, a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel largely
agreed with at least one aspect of Garcia’s proposals, namely to
make tariff preferences unconditional. The WTO panel ruled that
any conditions on tariff preferences granted by developed to
developing countries are inconsistent with current WTO law, with
the exception of preferential treatment to least-developed
countries and a priori import limitations for products originating
in particularly competitive developing countries.25 On appeal,
however, the Appellate Body considerably softened this ruling,
finding that when developed countries grant tariff preferences to
developing countries, they must make identical tariff preferences
available to all similarly-situated developing country beneficiaries;
in this way, developing countries in different situations can be
distinguished and tariff preferences can be conditioned on certain
requirements.26 Any such distinctions, however, must “respond
positively” to the “development, financial [or] trade needs” of
developing countries.27 Questions remain, though, as to precisely
what those needs are, who defines them, and what it means to
“respond positively” to them.28
III.  CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Garcia’s Trade, Inequality, and Justice offers a convincing account
of why justice matters in the world of trade. As suggested by the
above short list of examples of trade questions,29 the problem of
justice in trade is far broader and more complex than the bipolar
23. Id. at 181–82.
24. Id. at 189–90.
25. WTO Panel Report on E.C. Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R, para. 7.116 (Dec. 1, 2003).
26. WTO Appellate Body Report on E.C. Conditions for the Granting of Tariff
Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, para. 16 (Apr. 7, 2004).
27. Id. at para. 133.
28. For further discussion of the case as it would apply to U.S. preference systems, see
Amy M. Mason, The Degeneralization of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Questioning
the Legitimacy of the U.S. GSP, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2005).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 4–6.
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relationship between developed and developing countries; even
within that relationship, it transcends the limited issue of special
and differential treatment. Trade also raises questions of justice
and redistribution in several circumstances: (1) between the
winners and losers of trade within countries—for example, U.S.
exporters benefiting from trade while U.S. factory workers are laid
off because of trade, Brazilians active in the export of cotton,30 and
those unable to afford AIDS medicine because of intellectual
property protections31; and (2) among different countries in the
large and heterogeneous group that Garcia refers to as “the
developing world”—for example, Pakistan’s receipt of more
generous tariff preferences than India on the European textile
market because of Pakistan’s alleged unique drug trafficking
problem, as discussed in the E.C.-Tariff Preferences case,32 or the
competition between Brazil and even poorer Caribbean nations to
sell sugar in the E.C.33 Indeed, it cannot be taken for granted that
all developing countries are “least advantaged” and therefore
deserve special treatment; at the WTO, a country is deemed
“developing” not based on an economic scale but rather through
self-selection. Thus, as long as Singapore, Korea, or China claim
the status of developing country, they will have this designation
unless specific agreement provides otherwise. More important,
even within the limited sphere of the relation between developed
and developing countries, Garcia’s account of justice and the
remedies he provides raises three serious challenges. This Review
addresses them in turn.
A.  Are Economic Inequalities Between Developed and Developing
Countries Really Due to “Natural” Factors?
The basic premise that underlies Garcia’s entire theory—that
social and economic inequalities between developed and
developing countries are a result of inherent differences in their
natural endowments (under Rawls’ theory, an unfair distribution
of natural primary goods)—is open to question. Indeed, according
to Garcia, the injustice that triggers developed countries’ moral
duty of redistribution is the ex ante disadvantage in the allocation
30. See Request by Brazil for the Establishment of a WTO Panel Concerning U.S.
Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/7 (Feb. 7, 2003).
31. See Abbott, supra note 6.
32. See supra notes 25 and 26.
33. See Request by Brazil for the Establishment of a WTO Panel Concerning E.C.
Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS266/21 (July 11, 2003).
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of natural endowments; developing countries may have “small
economies” or an unfair share of factor endowments and, as a
result, cannot stand up to the competition of rich countries.
But if this is correct, why are small countries like Luxembourg,
Singapore, and Switzerland—which can hardly be called rich in
natural resources—at the top of the developed country ladder?
And why is Congo, with its vast territory and mineral wealth, or
India and Nigeria, with their overwhelming labor endowments, at
the bottom of the developing country ladder? Would it not be fair,
instead, to say that the inequalities between developed and
developing countries must be attributed largely to a combination
of historical—not natural—factors, including colonization and the
head start enjoyed by many developed countries in the industrial
revolution (often as a result of policies now prohibited by the
WTO), as well as political and economic mismanagement by
developing country governments themselves? To the extent that
inequalities between rich and poor countries are due to such
social factors, however, Garcia’s own “difference principle” does
not apply and the moral duty of redistribution that flows from it
evaporates. As Garcia acknowledges, “[t]he key normative
assumption underlying a Rawlsian account of inequality is that
differences in natural endowments, and consequent differences in
the allocation of social goods, are unmerited.”34 After all, the very
reason Rawls himself refuses to apply the “difference principle” in
support of international redistribution is that “the crucial element
in how a country fares is its political culture—its members’
political and civic virtues—and not the level of its resources.”35
This is not to say that current trade agreements ensure just
trade or that developing countries are undeserving of special
treatment. On the contrary, to the extent that developing
countries are disadvantaged as a result of past injustices, a strong
argument can be made for corrective, but not redistributive,
justice. As Garcia puts it, “[c]orrective justice . . . is a restorative
form of justice, of putting into balance something that has come
out of balance because of an injustice.”36 Redistributive justice, in
contrast, “involves the division of social goods which can be
divided or allocated . . . socially, by custom, opinion, informal
34. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 129.
35. RAWLS, supra note 16, at 117.
36. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 49.
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decisions, and formal allocative mechanisms.”37 Under Rawls’ and
Garcia’s theories of justice, however, redistributive justice is only
warranted—and consequently liberty can only be sacrificed—to
level inequalities in social goods resulting from morally arbitrary
distributions of natural endowments,38 and not to correct
inequalities arising from social factors like colonization,
exploitation, corruption, or mismanagement.39 These social factors
necessitate corrective justice on the part of the developed world
and good governance, including sounder economic policies, in
the developing countries themselves; but they do not call for
redistributive justice as defined by Garcia in Trade, Inequality, and
Justice.  At times, however, it is unclear whether Garcia intends his
claim for differential treatment and redistribution to apply only to
unjust and morally indefensible inequalities (as Rawls would have
it), or whether it is, rather, a broad-sweeping appeal for wealth
redistribution along egalitarian lines (encroaching on Rawls’ first
principle of justice grounded in liberty). Garcia implies, for
example, that a moral case could be made for international
taxation and generalized redistribution between countries only if
such remedies were politically feasible.40 Elsewhere, he seems to
abandon Rawls’ “balanced difference principle,” which permits
only some intrusions into liberty, in favor of a far-reaching
presumption that all inequalities require differential treatment.41
More generally, Trade, Inequality, and Justice risks falling into the
trap that David Henderson recently referred to as “development
pessimism” and the “salvationist consensus.”42 Henderson takes
issue with the common statement that “[s]ome 80% of people live
in developing countries and have to live off 20% of the planet’s
37. Id. at 48.
38. RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at 15 (referring to “aspects of the
social world that seem arbitrary from a moral point of view”).
39. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 61 (quoting RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, at
15) (“Rawls’ primary concern is . . . to elaborate a theory which ‘nullifies the accidents of
natural endowment.’”).
40. Id. at 207, 209.
41. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 175 (concluding that “treating unequals equally should
be considered prima facie unjust as a matter of ideal theory”). Garcia ought to explain how
he combines this view with his position that trade or other preferences granted by
developed to developing countries cannot be linked to any conditions. If developing
countries are different in terms of their respect for human rights, the environment, or the
way they do (or do not) tackle drug trafficking or political corruption, can they not be
seen as “unequals” that must—or at least may sometimes—be treated differently?
42. DAVID HENDERSON, THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN THE MODERN WORLD: PROGRESS,
PRESSURES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE MARKET ECONOMY 83, 87 (2004).
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goods.”43 Besides the basic economic error of using gross domestic
product (GDP) measured in market exchange rates rather than in
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates, which accounts for
differences in price levels among countries, he observes that such
assertions convey
the impression . . . that the goods and services that people,
businesses and governments currently buy are somehow made
available by “the planet” and then unequally—and hence
inequitably—distributed among countries. In fact, rich
countries are rich because their citizens produce more per
head, not because they have secured privileged access to “the
planet’s goods,” or to its “resources.”44
With regard to a remedy implied by such references to the gap
between rich and poor countries, Henderson notes that “the
argument implies that in the world of today developing countries
are fated to stay poor unless they are rescued from this condition
by being allocated more of the planet’s bounty.”45 “In this way of
thinking,” he continues, “the remarkable economic progress made
by initially poor countries over the past half-century, and the fact
that generally speaking it has owed little or nothing to flows or
programmes of assistance from outside, is ignored or mentioned
only in passing.”46
B.  “Equal” Free Trade May Offer More to Developing Countries than
“Special and Differential” Trade
Even if one accepts that developing countries deserve special
treatment (and I do, albeit for different reasons than Garcia), it
remains questionable whether developing countries should seek
such special treatment in the field of trade policy rather than
invest their limited bargaining chips and resources elsewhere—for
example, in achieving genuinely equal free trade, seeking
assistance in improving education, health services, and
infrastructure, and cultivating stable institutions, markets, and the
rule of law. Genuinely equal free trade would require, among
other things, liberalization in sectors where developing countries
are strong (textiles, agriculture) comparable to that in sectors of
43. Id. at 83.
44. Id.
45. Id.  He also refers more specifically to “the need for unreciprocated assistance
and concessions by the [richer] countries, in the form of aid flows, debt relief, unilateral
market opening, preferential trade agreements . . . and exemption of the developing
countries from [WTO disciplines].”  Id. at 86.
46. Id. at 85–86.
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interest to the developed world (industrials, information
technology); and stricter control over anti-dumping, to which rich
countries too often resort when their poorer counterparts gain
significantly in the game of free trade.47 Moreover, even assuming
the validity of Garcia’s difference principle for international
redistribution, it is not clear that it actually justifies special and
differential trade, even as remedied in its idealized form in
Garcia’s conclusion. As Garcia himself admits on several occasions,
the very premise that tariff preferences and market protection can
result in tangible benefits for “least advantaged states” is
doubtful.48 The mercantilist assumption that a country’s
protection of its market from competition will somehow boost
economic development is called into question by history’s lesson
that infant industries generally become less, rather than more,
competitive behind protectionist walls.49 While preferential access
to rich country markets may sound more promising, various
studies have shown that over the years this simply has not worked.50
In a detailed, empirical study of a quarter century of generalized
systems of preferences (GSP), Ozden and Reinhardt, using a
dataset of 154 developing countries, conclude that “developing
countries may be best served by full integration into the
reciprocity-based world trade regime rather than continued GSP-
style special preferences.”51 They even show that countries
removed from GSP performed better than those continuing to
benefit from preferences, thus demonstrating that GSP itself, and
not its conditions or the risk of losing benefits, may be at the heart
47. See infra text at note 53.
48. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 167 (“[T]he domestic pressure to manipulate the grant
of preferences is too strong to resist.”), 197 (“[T]he internal logic of special and
differential treatment is such that it is on a timetable towards elimination. . . . Even the
most generous additional implementation period will eventually come to an end.”).
49. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 42, at 85–86; JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FREE TRADE
TODAY 89-90 (2002); Paul Krugman, Enemies of the WTO: Bogus Arguments against the World
Trade Organization, SLATE (Nov. 24, 1999), at http://slate.msn.com/?id=56497 (“The raw
fact is that every successful example of economic development this past century—every
case of a poor nation that worked its way up to a more or less decent, or at least
dramatically better, standard of living—has taken place via globalization; that is, by
producing for the world market rather than trying for self-sufficiency.”).
50. See supra note 49; see also AGLAR ZDEN & ERIC REINHARDT, THE PERVERSITY OF
PREFERENCES: GSP AND DEVELOPING COUNTRY TRADE POLICIES, 1979–2000 (World Bank
Group, Working Paper No. 2955, 2003), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/23188_wps2955.pdf (las visited March 18, 2005).
51. Id. at 1, 22 (arguing “that the preferred scenario is one in which developing
countries give up GSP in favor of the reciprocity driven trade regime embodied in
GATT/WTO relationships among developed states”).
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of the problem.52
Rather than seeking special treatment, which results in trade
inequalities, developing countries should focus on obtaining equal
free trade. Indeed, the greatest benefit that developing countries
stand to reap from the world trade system will not result from
special treatment—less free trade—but rather from equal
liberalization—freer trade—in the export sectors of the most
interest to them, particularly agriculture and textiles. Stated
differently, the greatest injustice in the current trading system is
not that poorer countries are considered on equal footing with
richer countries, but rather that they are the ones being
discriminated against because trade is less open in those sectors
where developing countries are most competitive. Moreover, once
trade in these products is liberalized and developing countries can
compete, they often face purely protectionist (though WTO-
justified) contingency measures, such as safeguards or anti-
dumping measures, or see their competitive advantage curtailed
by export subsidies and overly strict sanitary requirements in
developed countries.53 As Garcia himself acknowledges, and as any
U.S. manufacturing worker will confirm, genuinely free trade is
destined to benefit the poor countries more than the rich. In
Garcia’s words, “[b]y allowing the principle of comparative
advantage to operate, free trade moves the trading system in the
direction of operating to the benefit of the least advantaged, by
affording them the opportunity for welfare increases through
specialization”54; furthermore, “market access for developing
countries allows the inequalities that manifest themselves in the
form of wealthy consumer markets to work for the benefit of the
least advantaged, thereby meeting the central criteria for
distributive justice.”55 Indeed, completely free trade—including, in
particular, free movement of workers—would lead to a
redistribution of wealth between rich and poor countries that
trade preferences or protectionism cannot provide.56 What Garcia
52. Id. at 3.  “[I]f there is a threat of removal from the GSP program when its exports
increase significantly, then the recipient has the perverse incentive to implement even
more protectionist policies to limit its exports and avoid such outcomes.”  Id. at 1.
53. See OXFAM, RIGGED RULES AND DOUBLE STANDARDS: TRADE, GLOBALIZATION AND
THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 5 (2002) (“The problem is not that international trade is
inherently opposed to the needs and interests of the poor, but that the rules that govern it
are rigged in favour of the rich.”).
54. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 107.
55. Id. at 149.
56. See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, FEASIBLE GLOBALIZATIONS 19–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
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seems to overlook, however, is that the WTO and other trade
agreements do not produce free trade but instead create patchy
liberalized trade, skewed in favor of developed country exports
and reinforced by a series of safety valves that mainly benefit the
rich and can be employed as a last resort in the case that
developing countries pull too far ahead in the trade race.57
What is worse, this skewed trade liberalization was not imposed
solely on developing countries but was partly a result of special
and differential treatment: because developing countries did not
offer any market access concessions, under the principle of non-
reciprocity, they did not receive any significant consideration in
return.58 Furthermore, whatever preferential treatment they did
receive was difficult to enforce. The cardinal rule for trade
concessions is reciprocity: “If you withdraw my market access, I will
restrict your imports.” If, however, a country gives little in terms of
market access (as has been the case in much of the developing
world), they will not enjoy the reciprocal benefits; by not being
forced to open their economies, developing countries have lost
out on market access abroad and have also failed to lock in
domestic economic reforms that could have stabilized and
modernized their economies.59 In this sense, special and
differential treatment may actually have worked against the least
advantaged rather than benefiting them as required under
Garcia’s international “difference principle.”60
C.  The Alternative of Justice Through Individual Human Rights
Garcia’s principle of justice—focused on state-to-state,
developed versus developing countries—and the inevitable
problems of practical application between and within countries
that accompany it, begs the question of whether justice in trade is
better approached from the bottom up, based on universally
recognized human rights of individuals. Although Garcia speaks
Research, Working Paper No. 9129, 2002), http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9129.pdf
(last visited Mar. 18, 2005) (“The biggest bang by far lies in something that was not even
on the agenda at Doha: relaxing restrictions on the international movement of workers . .
. . [L]iberalizing cross-border labor movements can be expected to yield benefits that are
roughly 25 times larger than those that would accrue from the traditional agenda focusing
on goods and capital flows!”).
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. See generally ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE GATT LEGAL
SYSTEM (1987).
59. Id.
60. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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somewhat nostalgically of the failed New International Economic
Order (NIEO), for which a developing world largely dominated by
dictatorships fought in the 1970s,61 he rightly departs from the
NIEO’s approach to trade and inequality, which focused on a so-
called “right to development” in the hands of poorer nations.62 He
nonetheless fails to address the individual human rights approach,
which does not impart a legal right to development to developing
countries (as did the NIEO), nor a moral duty on the part of
developed countries (as Garcia does), but rather interprets and
applies trade law in the light of universally-recognized human
rights of individuals—both political and economic.63 This is, in
other words, an approach where justice is not found in a single
meta-principle that is difficult to apply and balance in the non-
ideal world of trade (like Rawls’ difference principle), but where
justice is infused into trade law—and must at times trump free
trade obligations—by means of human rights that have matured
and gained specificity and normative value at the international
level in the more than fifty years since the adoption of the United
Nations Declaration on Human Rights.64 As Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann explains, “[f]rom a human rights perspective,
international justice refers, above all, to human rights and
democratic procedures that justify the allocation and protection of
equal basic rights, and the distribution of scarce resources
necessary for personal self-development of individuals as morally
and rationally autonomous social human beings.”65 In this view,
“justice” remains a never-ending regulatory task and “cannot be
related to any one value, be it equality or any other, but only to the
61. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 9 (“The NIEO’s claims were explicitly framed in terms of
justice.”).  Many would argue, however, that NIEO claims were inspired as much (if not
more) by authoritarian elites in developing countries aimed at expanding their personal
power base as by lofty ideals of justice benefiting the poor in developing countries.  See
Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of the Failure of NIEO, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT 82–100 (Canadian Council on International Law, XV Annual Conference
Proceedings, 1986).
62. GARCIA, supra note 1, at 9–10.
63. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights, and the Constitution
of International Markets, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 407, 412 (2003) (“[C]ontrary to the
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complex value system of a man, a community, or mankind.”66 Why
reinvent the wheel, it could be argued, if the toolbox of human
rights (though far from perfect itself) is there for the taking, and
is both more precise and more “liberal,” focused directly on
individuals rather than states?
In the end, therefore, the first 144 pages of Trade, Inequality, and
Justice may be the most important for its success in identifying
(part of) the problem. Although Garcia’s broad call for
redistributive justice between developed and developing countries
is questionable within his own theory, and the example of special
and differential treatment is not the optimal, nor by far the most
important, means of enhancing justice in world trade, the book is
one of the first to apply abstract theories of justice to concrete
questions of international trade law. It also provides a convincing
critique of current preferential trade schemes. For these reasons,
Trade, Inequality, and Justice deserves the attention of anyone
interested in political philosophy, trade, and the plight of
developing countries.
66. CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
199 (2d ed. 1963). Or, as Petersmann puts it, “[t]he universal recognition of human rights
requires basing ‘international justice’—contrary to the views of John Rawls—not only on
freedom and equality of peoples, but also on equal human rights and multi-level
constitutionalism.” Petersmann, supra note 63, at 458.
